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Recent Decisions
ANTITRUST-STATUTES OF LIMITATION, TOLLING, FUTURE
DAMAGES-Government Suits Toll The Statute Against Co-Con-
spirators Not Brought Before The Court. The Statute Does Not Run
On Speculative Damages. Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
Canadian Radio Patents Ltd., a patent pool formed by American
electronics companies and controlled by their subsidiaries,' held
the Canadian patent rights to processes for the production of radio
and television receivers. It protected its licencees from foreign
competition by requiring those acquiring rights to manufacture
products covered by the patents only in Canada." The pool con-
ducted intensive enforcement activities including "warning" the
public through newspapers of the danger and low quality of foreign-
made radio and television equipment In 1958 the United States
brought antitrust proceedings against members of the patent pool
charging them with conspiracy in restraint of foreign trade and
commerce." A year earlier Zenith Radio Corporation released three
members of the pool from any liability arising from violation of the
antitrust laws and received $10 million in consideration In 1959
because of Zenith's efforts to sell its products on the Canadian
market without buying rights in the patent pool, Hazeltine Re-
search Inc. (HRI) sued Zenith for patent infringement. In 1963
'See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51, 74
(N.D. I11. 1965). Canadian General Electric Co. (a subsidiary of General Electric
Co. of the United States) and Canadian Westinghouse (a subsidiary of Westing-
house Electric Corp.) formed the pool in 1926. Shareholders in the pool were
Canadian General Electric, Canadian Westinghouse, Standard Radio Mfg. Corp.
Ltd. (a subsidiary of N.V. Philip's Gloeilampenfabrieken, a Netherlands firm),
Canadian Marconi, and Northern Electric (an affiliate of AT&T and Western
Electric Co.).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 75.
4 United States v. General Electric Co., 170 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
The complaint named 13 co-conspirators. Those made parties defendant were
N.V. Gloeilampenfabrieken, Westinghouse, and General Electric.
'See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 326
(1971).
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Zenith counterclaimed alleging violations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts Zenith submitted evidence showing the operation of
the conspiracy and its resulting damages. A year after the evidence
was closed the trial judge made preliminary findings favoring
Zenith. HRI moved to amend its pleadings to assert the defenses of
limitations' and release.
The trial judge permitted the defenses to be filed but, without
explanation, refused to reopen the record for new evidence. The
court rendered judgment in favor of Zenith for 16 million dollars
before trebling for damages caused by the conspiracy in England,
Australia and Canada.' The Seventh Circuit reversed for failure to
prove damages.! The Supreme Court reversed on the issue of dam-
ages sustained in the Canadian market and noted that the trial
court had either rejected HRI's defenses on their merits or had
deemed them waived.1" On remand the court of appeals found that
HRI's defenses had been erroneously rejected on their merits and
held that both the statute of limitation and the release barred any
recovery by Zenith.1 The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.1'
Held, reversed: (1) It is within the discretion of the trial court to
refuse to reopen the record when the motion for leave to amend was
not made until a year after the close of evidence; (2) a govern-
ment suit alleging conspiratorial violations of the antitrust laws
tolls the statute of limitations against all members of the con-
spiracy regardless of whether they are made defendants or named
in the government suit; (3) in antitrust suits, if future damages
are speculative and unrecoverable in an action brought within four
years from the commission of the illegal act, no cause of action
arises and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
damages are actually incurred; and (4) a release of one joint tort-
feasor does not release another joint tortfeasor unless the parties
so intend. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401
U.S. 321 (1971).
0 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2,5, and 26 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
8 Hazeltine Research Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51, 76 (N.D.
11. 1965).
"Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967).
10 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
11 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969).
1Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 397 U.S. 979 (1970).
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The purpose of this note is to examine the portions of the
Court's opinion dealing with tolling of the limitations period, the
running of the limitations period with respect to future damages,
and the scope of releases.13 Each portion represents a significant
step toward providing victims of antitrust violations redress to the
fullest extent.
I.
Section 5 of the Clayton Acte was enacted to encourage private
enforcement of the antitrust laws. Because the complexity and
13 The Court's rationale in holding that it is within the discretion of the trial
judge to refuse to permit amendment of pleadings under these circumstances ran
as follows. Zenith contended that by FED. R. Civ. P. 8, HRI was required to set
forth affirmatively defenses in its pleadings. By its failure to do so, Zenith con-
tended that FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) applied so that HRI had waived "all defenses
and objections which [HRI did not] present." HRI contended that by FED. R.
Civ. P. 15(a) amendment was proper because "leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires." and that it was erroneous for the judge to fail to consider
these defenses. The Court said it was well settled that amendment of pleadings
is within the discretion of the trial court and that although prejudice to HRI
might result from refusing to permit amendment, prejudice to Zenith should also
be considered. HRI's extreme delay in asserting these defenses would prejudice
Zenith by requiring it to virtually retry the issue of damages. Thus, although the
trial judge failed to state why he had rejected the defenses, the result could be
justified as a discretionary refusal to permit amendment of pleadings or, as the
remainder of the opinion reflects, on their merits.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion found that it was clear that the defenses
had been rejected because the judge considered them waived and argued that it
was not necessary to reach the other issues.
14 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), provides:
(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered
in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the
United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant
has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under section 15a of this title, as to all
matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an
estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section
shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any
testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered before
any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered
in actions under section 15a of this title.
(b) Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by
the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any
of the antitrust laws, but not including an action under section 15a
of this title, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of
every private right of action arising under said laws and based in
whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year
thereafter: Provided, however, That whenever the running of the
statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under
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expense of an antitrust suit makes it impossible for many plaintiffs
to assert their rights under the antitrust laws,"5 Section 5 was de-
signed to enable private litigants to use the products of investiga-
tion and discovery of a suit prosecuted by the government in a
subsequent suit in their own behalf.
Section 5(a)' 6 provides that the defendant in a government suit
is estopped from denying in a subsequent private action facts
which were necessary to the result reached in the government ac-
tion. Section 5(b)" tolls the statute of limitations in a private
right of action based wholly or partially on any matter complained
of in the government suit. The limitations period is suspended from
the date of filing the government complaint until one year after
the date the case ceases to pend, when no further action can be
taken on the case."
Section 5(a) operates only against a party defendant in a gov-
ernment suit. This means that a private litigant cannot use a
judgment in a government suit as prima facie evidence unless the
private defendant was a defendant in the government action. Sec-
tion 5 (b) has broader application. Tolling of the statute of limita-
tions is allowed if the private claim is based only in part on matters
litigated by the government, giving a broader "subject matter
scope" to this section. Judicial interpretation had further expanded
the "party scope" of section 5(b) so that absolute identity of
parties in the two actions is not required. 9
For many years courts assumed that the two subsections operated
in concert;"0 that before tolling would occur, the plaintiff had to be
section 15 of this title is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce
such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced
either within the period of suspension or within four years after the
cause of action accrued.
'" See, c.f., Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
16 15 U.S.C. § 16a (1970).
17 15 U.S.C. § 16b (1970).
"8 Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966); see also
Recent Decisions, Antitrust: Treble Damage Plaintiffs Aided By Expansive Inter-
pretations Of Clayton Act § 5, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 572 (1971).
'" See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
20 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir.
1964); Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1956); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.
1954); Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967
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entitled to use a former judgment as prima facie evidence against
his defendant. The question of whether the two sections were
intended by Congress to be interdependent was resolved by the
Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co.' The Court held that the statute of limitations
is tolled by "Commission proceedings to the same extent and in the
same circumstances as it is by Justice Department actions.
'2 2
Later in the same year, the interrelationship between the tolling
and the estoppel provisions of section 5 came before the Supreme
Court in Leh v. General Petroleum Corp.2' The question was
whether the array of parties defendant must necessarily be identical
in the government suit and in the subsequent private action in'
order for tolling to attach.2" The Court held that absolute identity
of parties was not required and tolling operated under these cir-
cumstances. Considering Congressional policy objectives and com-
paring the complaints in the two actions, the Court warned that
(D. Me. 1963); Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp.
712 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), afl'd, 346 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 904 (1965); Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 996
(D. Mass. 1942), aft'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967
(1949). See also, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 811 (1966).
21381 U.S. 311 (1965).
21Id. at 318.
23382 U.S. 54 (1965).
24 After a government action against an alleged conspiracy resulted in consent
decrees against all defendants, Leh brought a private suit alleging similar viola-
tions. Two defendants in the government suit were not included in the private
suit. One party, not a defendant in the government suit, was included in the
private suit. The party added, however, had been a defendant in the government
suit until being dismissed shortly before trial. See 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 811
(1966).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflict between the circuits.
The lower court had dismissed Leh on the rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956): "The
same means must be used to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies
by the same defendants." 232 F.2d at 196. The Tenth Circuit had rejected Steiner,
holding that "section 5(b), as amended, was intended to suspend the running of
the statute . . . during the pendency of a government-instituted suit which com-
plained of all, or a part of the means relied upon by the private plaintiff to effect
the same general combination and conspiracy.
"These private suits alleged substantially the same conspiracy against the same
defendants as in the government suit. . . . There was substantial identity of sub-
ject matter, and this was sufficient to suspend the running of the statute." 300
F.2d 561, 570 (emphasis added); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300
F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962), aff'd under Rule 60 sub nom., Trade v. Union Car-
bide & Carbon Corp., 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
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the statute must not be construed in a way which would defeat
these objectives. Thus in 1965, substantial identity of parties in a
suit based at least in part on matters complained of in the govern-
ment suit was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
Zenith is the latest Supreme Court interpretation of the tolling
statute. The key issue concerning tolling was whether a 1957 gov-
ernment antitrust suit had suspended the running of the statute of
limitations on Zenith's rights against HRI. The government had
not made HRI a party nor had HRI been named as a co-con-
spirator during the course of the proceedings.' The Court found
that the running of the statute was suspended "since it is undisputed
that the conspiracy in which HRI participated was at least in part
the same conspiracy as was the object of the government suit. ' ' "
Section 5(b) provides for tolling "in respect of every private
right of action ... based in whole or in part on any matter com-
plained of" in the government suit. 7 The Court viewed a private
action against a member of the same conspiracy against which the
government had taken action as "undeniably" within the meaning
of the statute. This furthers the purpose of Congress by enabling
private litigants to make use of any benefits accruing to them from
the government action. The holding is consistent with the trend set
by Minnesota Mining and Leh broadening the circumstances in
which tolling will operate.
Zenith has significantly enlarged the class of private defendants
against which tolling can operate to include defendants in the
previous government suit, non-parties proved or alleged to be con-
spirators in the government suit, and those not connected with the
government suit but found to be co-conspirators in the subsequent
private action. Zenith eliminates a shelter for conspirators fortunate
enough to be left out of the government suit. Government selec-
tivity, incompetence, or the conspirator's hidden role in the con-
spiracy, will no longer provide an escape from liability for the
defendant sued within the extended limitations period. In reaching
2 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969).
Here, Hazeltine was not named as a party, was never served and did not for-
mally appear at the trial.
11Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 337-38
(1971).
27 Id. at 335 (emphasis the Court's).
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this result however, the court implicitly elevated the objectives of
tolling over the countervailing objectives of statutes of limitation.
A potential defendant should not forever be prepared to defend
himself, neither is it in the interest of justice to require a court to
decide cases on the basis of stale evidence. 8 On the other hand,
the advantages accuring to plaintiffs through tolling make it easier
for the "man of small means injured by antitrust violators to have
these injuries redressed by making available to him the fruits of
government investigation and discovery. '"' It is easier to justify the
operation of tolling against those associated with the government
suit who have had to prepare defenses and procure records and
witnesses. While tolling works no hardship on a party defendant
required to re-produce the same evidence in a later suit after the
four year period has expired, the defendant not associated with
the government suit has not been put on notice, has not been re-
quired to prepare his defense within the limitations period and has
not been advised of the necessity of retaining evidence.
Prejudice may be minimal because of the high degree of aware-
ness in the corporate community. Few corporations in a position
to be affected by the antitrust laws act without the advice of
counsel. This awareness undoubtedly reaches paranoiac levels in
corporations active in an industry being investigated by the gov-
ernment; hence, few defendants, in cases where section 5(b) ap-
plies, could realistically claim lack of notice. A defendant unaware
of the government proceeding, however, would be prejudiced if
sued many years after the alleged illegal act. Because the right to
benefit from the statute of limitations is a substantive right," the
21 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944). "The theory is that it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to de-
fend within the period of limitations and that the right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." 321 U.S. at 349.
21S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959), H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d
Cong. 2d Sess. 14 (1959).
'
0 See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) in
which the court indicated that the statute of limitations is generally thought of as
a procedural device but that the defendant's right to repose is a substantive right.
See also, 37 J. Aut L. & COM. 235 (1971).
Due process rights of notice and the right to be heard have been expanded in
recent years. A general rule is that before property interests can be disturbed,
notice must be given. That notice must be timely and adequate. The expansion
began with condemnation suits in which a non-resident owner was "notified" of
proceedings against his land by signs posted on or near his land. The rule came
1972]
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prejudice may rise to constitutional dimensions; the defendant be-
ing deprived of due process by not being notified that the statute
of limitations has been tolled as a result of government proceedings
to which he was not a party. The protracted period of tolling also
deprives the defendant of the right to be heard because many
records and personnel required for a successful defense are no
longer available. Moreover, a judgment from the earlier suit, will
have an overwhelming presumptive effect against which the de-
fendant was unable to protect himself at the time it was rendered
and now unable to rebutt. A more equitable policy would require
a plaintiff to give notice of intent to sue at the time he becomes
aware of his claim against the defendant and then to proceed with
the suit after the completion of the government action.
One difficulty observed in Leh remained unresolved by Zenith."
The Court has defined the limits of the party scope of section 5 (b),
but has not clarified the scope of the subject matter which will
allow tolling. The words of section 5(b) refer to party scope and
to subject matter in defining which actions are entitled to tolling.
To assert tolling a plaintiff must have an action arising under the
antitrust laws and based partly upon matters complained of in the
government suit. In Zenith, the Court was satisfied that the plain-
tiff had met the subject matter requirements because the conspiracy
that HRI had participated in was "at least in part""' the same con-
spiracy which had been prosecuted in the government suit.
A difficult question arises if the plaintiff alleges antitrust viola-
tions and asserts tolling, but his allegations are only remotely re-
to be that the condemnor must use such means as would be used by a person
interested in giving actual notice. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 203
(1962); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Walker v. Hutchinson City,
352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950). This reasoning has been extended to adequacy of notice in criminal
proceedings, In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967); and to pre-judgment garnishment,
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The thrust of these
cases is that notice must be given in order to allow a litigant an opportunity to
be heard in the controversy affecting him. Timeliness is required in order to allow
preparation and to afford a meaningful right to be heard. It does not seem to
beg the question to assert that a defendant's right to be heard will be impaired
in antitrust proceedings if notice of a claim against him is not given until many
years after the act giving rise to a claim was committed. During this period, a
turn-over of employees and records could occur, making it difficult to present an
effective case.
"See, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1661 (1965).
"2 401 U.S. at 337-38.
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lated to the government suit. Such a case could charge similar
violations requiring similar proof but in different time periods, or
to take advantage of the tolling statute, allege different violations
requiring different proof and related to the government suit in form
only. In light of the Supreme Court's strong stand against antitrust
violations it appears that the lower courts will be impelled toward
a presumption of tolling, disallowing it only when the plaintiff is
unable to show any relation between his suit and the government
sut. The Third Circuit, however, appears to have taken the position
that claims alleged in the government suit and the private suit
must be substantially identical."
Both party scope and subject matter scope should be taken into
account in each case, giving neither factor a fixed value, but
judging the propriety of allowing tolling according to a concept of
overall fairness. Using this approach, when there is a greater degree
of identity under one of the criteria, a more liberal standard should
be used in determining whether the other criterion is met. Thus, if
a private plaintiff sues a party against whom the government has
already taken action, the subject matter requirements should be
minimal because the defendant has already been put on notice of
possible violations and will not be taken by surprise. This ap-
proach would reduce the chance of certain violators going un-
punished because of the government's failure to include them in its
broader based action. ' On the other hand if a private action alleges
antitrust violations against defendants not parties in the govern-
ment suit, the requirements for satisfaction of the subject matter
standard should be more strict and the plaintiff should be required
to prove that his case is based on the government action in more
than a token sense. This rule could be applied to the party scope
standard, but Zenith appears to give party scope a fixed value.
However, even though the party scope standard has been fixed, a
fairness standard can be applied as long as the subject matter
standard remains flexible."
'New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 387 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 1967).
The possibility of certain violations going unnoticed by the government
was considered in Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964).
The court there was of the opinion that this should not be a bar to the plaintiff.
" Difficulty with the fairness rule may be that it does not apprise the parties
of their rights under the limitations statute until a judicial determination is made,
1972]
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I.
The Court turned to the question of when a right of action arises
under the antitrust laws. HRI claimed the limitations period ran
from the date of the illegal act while Zenith contended the statute
ran from the date damages were actually suffered. A plaintiff in-
jured as a result of an antitrust violation is entitled to recover all
damages already suffered, plus future damages whose nature and
extent are capable of proof. The Court reasoned that "[i]n these
instances, the cause of action for future damages, if they ever occur
will occur only on the date they are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff
may sue to recover them at any time within four years from the
date they were inflicted."'"
This portion of the opinion provides a uniform standard for ap-
plying section 4(b) of the Clayton Act.8" Section 4(b) provides
that any "action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15
or 15(a) of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced
within 4 years after the cause of action accrued." Prior to 1955
when section 4(b) was enacted, the period of limitations was a
matter of state law;88 the limitations periods ranging from one" to
six years."0
Bluefields Steam Ship Co. v. United Fruit Co."' is the earliest and
most important case applying the statute of limitations to a claim
based on conspiratorial violation of the antitrust laws. That case
held that the statute of limitations "began to run when the cause of
action arose, and the cause of action arose when the damage oc-
curred. . . ."' Bluefields has been interpreted in two ways. Some
and that a flexible rule should not be used because of the conflict it is likely to
breed among the courts in cases which arise out of the same conspiracy. The
answer to these criticisms is that this rule would be more certain than no rule for
subject matter requirements, as we have now, and that the substantial identity
test is not consistent with the instant rejection of identity requirements as to party
scope. Also, rules of collateral estoppel would apply to many of these cases.
86401 U.S. at 339.
37 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
88 See Schiffman Bros., Inc. v. Texas Co., 196 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1952).
"See American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 F. 58, 60 (5th
Cir. 1913), (Louisiana law).
40 See Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theaters Corp., 248 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958) (New York law).
"' 243 F. 1 (3d Cir. 1917), dismissed per stipulation, 248 U.S. 595 (1918).
ld. at 20.
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courts have held that damage occurs upon the commission of the
act which invades a plaintiff's interest. ' This is the "act point" ap-
proach. The other interpretation, the "damage point" approach,
views the point at which the injury appears on the plaintiff's books
as the time from which the statute runs; for without damages, there
is no right of action under the antitrust laws." Both approaches re-
quired, prior to Zenith, that the conspirators be shown to have
committed an overt act within the limitations period." The "act
point" approach views the illegal act as initiating the limitations
period, and even if damages are still occurring the cause would be
barred if more than four years had elapsed since the commission of
the illegal act. The "damage point" theory has been applied in
cases where a complex and continuing conspiracy encompasses a
wide variety of illegal act and injures many victims." This ap-
proach recognizes the impossibility of attempting to isolate a cer-
tain act as responsible for the specific injury alleged by the plaintiff.
It seeks to prevent the statute from running before the plaintiff
becomes aware of the illegal activity. The limitations period begins
to run with each day's damage as it occurs.
Zenith is a hybrid. The "act point" approach is applied to non-
speculative damages recoverable in a suit instituted within four
years after the commission of the illegal act. If future damages are
speculative and unrecoverable, the "damage point" approach is
applied. The time when damages are actually suffered is the time
"Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 714 (7th Cir.
1956); Crummer Co. v. E.I. Dupont Nemours Co., 223 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1955);
Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, 43 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1942); Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M. D. Pa. 1965),
aff'd, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
" Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir.
1964); Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 185 F.2d 196
(9th Cir. 1950); Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 170 F.2d 569
(9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1948); Foster & Kleister Co. v. Spe-
cial Site Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 613 (1937).
"IPeto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 384 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1967);
Garelick v. Goerlich's, Inc., 323 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956); Suckow Borax Mines
v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924
(1948); A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1957).
"Delta Theaters, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 644, 648
(E.D. La. 1958); Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D.
La. 1958). Judge Wright's rule in Delta Theaters is the most perceptive of the
lower court cases, and appears to be the first case setting forth a rule similar to
the one adopted in the instant case.
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the statute begins to run. Most important, however, is that after
the "act point" limitations period has run, a determination that
certain damages would have been speculative had suit been brought
within that period, can remove the bar to recovery for those dam-
ages, even though no suit had been filed within the original period.
The new rule is consistent with the objective of section 4(b)" in
that the standard rightfully favors adequate and accurate compen-
sation for those injured by violators.
While Zenith has expanded the plaintiff's capacity to recover
for antitrust violations, it may have done so at the expense of
making it more difficult to recover future damages during the
initial limitations period. As a result, multiple proceedings may be
required to dispose of the action. The courts have traditionally
resisted awarding future damages without sufficient proof showing
that the amount of damages was not speculative even though dam-
age or illegal conduct was indisputable.' Prior to Zenith, the
courts determined whether the damages were speculative; if they
were, recovery was barred. Zenith has removed the factor favoring
awarding future damages-the instinct against allowing a victim
to go incompletely compensated and permitting a wrong to go
unpunished. Now, if future damages are found to be speculative, a
new limitations period will begin to run when the damages are
suffered. Further, language in Zenith, indicates that future dam-
ages are not recoverable. 9Moreover, a defendant can argue that
the plaintiff's action in the future damage period is time barred
because the damages he is seeking, although future, were not so
speculative as to be unrecoverable in a suit brought during the
original limitations period."
41 See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
41 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (re-
garding damages in England and Australia); Moe Light, Inc. v. Foreman, 238
F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1956).
411401 U.S. at 339-41. "... future damages that might arise from the conduct
sued on are unrecoverable if the fact of their accrual is speculative or their
amount and nature unprovable. . . . In these instances, the cause of action for
future damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on the date they are suffered.
. . . We find it difficult to believe that Zenith could have convinced a District
Court sitting in 1954 that, although it contemplated a free market from that time
forward, it would still be suffering from provable injury more than five years
later." (Emphasis added.)
0401 U.S. at 339. "Thus, if a plaintiff feels the adverse impact of an antitrust
conspiracy on a particular date, a cause of action immediately accrued to him to
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Another consideration favoring the older rule is the policy seek-
ing efficient administration of the judicial system. Zenith cannot
be reconciled with this policy because a substantial number of
antitrust cases will require multiple proceedings before an action is
finally terminated. The secondary proceedings will not be summary
in nature; even though liability will be res judicata, proof of the
quantum of damages and of causation will be hotly contested."' A
trend away from complete adjudication in a single proceeding will
have a disasterous effect if allowed to spread beyond this limited
area.
Undoubtedly, the Court was justified in establishing a rule pre-
venting a plaintiff from being barred by the statute of limitations
before he is aware of the defendant's illegal acts, as when the con-
trolling acts occur at a point in the manufacturing chain far from
the ultimate victim. On the other hand this rule does not encourage
vigilance and prompt action and will result in delay as a part of the
plaintiff's strategy. The better rule would be to require the filing of
suit (or notice of intent to sue) within the original limitations period
measured by the commission of the illegal act, subject to exception
in cases in which the injured party has not learned of the illegal
act until after the limitations period has lapsed.
III.
In settlement of a civil treble damage action against other mem-
bers of the pool, Zenith received in 1957 10 million dollars for its
execution of releases naming Western Electric Co., General Elec-
tric Co. and Radio Corporation of America. The release gave up
any right of action Zenith "ever had, now has ... or shall or may
have for ... any matter, court or thing whatsoever from the begin-
recover all damages incurred by that date and all provable damages that will flow
in the future from the acts of the conspirators on that date." This language in-
dicates that the cause of action accrues on all but speculative damages at the time
the act is committed and that suit must be brought within the 4 year period on
these damages. Therefore, in an action such as the one between HRI and Zenith,
in which the issue of whether certain damages were or were not speculative at
the time the illegal act was committed is not res judicata, the defendant could
argue that they would not have been speculative in the original limitations period,
and therefore were governed by the earlier limitations period.
1 The difficulty here results from the many variables at work in the market-
place. Over a period of time, it will be harder and harder for a plaintiff to prove
that his market share has been diminished by defendant's illegal activity rather
than by the forces of competition, advertising, innovation, etc.
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ning of the world to the date of these presents."" The question in
Zenith was whether an unnamed joint tortfeasor was also released.
Three rules have been applied to govern a release not naming
all joint tortfeasors. The common law rule is that a release given
to one joint tortfeasor releases all joint tortfeasors." The 1939
Restatement of Torts modified the rule to release all unless the
parties agreed to the contrary.' The modern rule is that a "release
of one tortfeasor from liability does not discharge others liable for
the same harm, unless it is agreed that it shall do so.""
The common law rule raises a conclusive presumption of abso-
lute release;" the Restatement changed this to a rebuttable pre-
sumption."7 The modern rule reverses the presumption, excluding
from the operation of the release any offending parties not named
in the instrument. Thus, the burden is shifted to the defendant who
must show that he is entitled to the benefit of the release."
The reason for this evolution is the former rule had become a
trap for many releasors, especially those who executed releases
hastily or without legal advice. 9 The Restatement rule often caused
the scope of the release to be broader than the releasor intended.
The modern rule is representative of the increasing effort to give
effect to the intentions of the parties.
The common law rule is applied in only two states."0 Most
jurisdictions0 ' follow the intermediate rule of the Restatement.
12401 U.S. at 342-43, n.10.
"
3W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 269 (3d Ed. 1964); see Western Express
Co. v. Smeltzer, 88 F.2d 94, 95 (6th Cir. 1937); American Ry. Express Co. v.
Stone, 27 F.2d 8, 10 (Ist Cir. 1928); Barrett v. Third Avenue R.R. Co., 45 N.Y.
628, 635 (1871).
54 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885 (1939), hereinafter cited as "RESTATEMENT,
1ST."
5" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 885(1), (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970),
hereinafter cited as "RESTATEMENT, 2D."
"
0 See, e.g., Ellis v. Essan, 50 Wis. 138, 6 N.W. 518 (1880).
"1 RESTATEMENT, 1ST, § 885 (1939); 401 U.S. at 345-46.
58 RESTATEMENT, 2D, § 885, comment, at 183-92 (1970).
'g W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 272.
00The two states are Washington and Virginia. See Rust v. Schlaitzer, 175
Wash. 331, 27 P.2d 571 (1933); Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 168
S.E. 443 (1933).
01 Twenty-one states have adopted this rule by statute: Alabama, Arkansas,
Wyoming, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode
RECENT DECISIONS
The issue in Zenith was whether to follow the Restatement rule
and deny recovery to Zenith for failing to reserve rights against
HRI, or to adopt a new rule which would not require such an
express reservation. In a 1964 patent infringement case, Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.," the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff retained a right of action against the defendant
after it had released third parties in an instrument which failed to
reserve its rights against the defendant. "A release given a direct
infringer in respect of past infringements which clearly intends
to save the releasor's rights against a past contributory infringer,
does not automatically surrender those rights.""
Zenith cites Aro as adopting the modem rule which "[gives]
effect to the intentions of the parties,"'" and applied this rule to
the release executed by Zenith. The Court's reference to Aro is
inapplicable. The issue in Aro was whether the common law rule
of absolute release without regard to the intent of the parties was
still applicable. Although Aro rejected the common law rule, it
did not reach the question of which party had the burden of
proving an intent to reserve rights. Since Aro did not distinguish
between the Restatement and the modem rule, it cannot be taken
as adopting the modem rule. The Restatement rule was widely
acceptedr in the courts at the time of the Ara decision, lending
weight to the argument that the failure to reject the majority
Restatement rule indicated an implied acceptance of it.
The Restatement rule has been criticized as a trap for the
ignorant and unwary. If this is the primary reason for the change,
Zenith does not fit within the framework of the policy justifying
such a change. The same attorney who twice represented Zenith
before the Supreme Court against HRI also represented Zenith
Island, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Texas and the District
of Columbia have adopted the intermediate rule by judicial decision, RESTATE-
MENT, 2D, supra note 55, at 189-90.
62 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
63 Id. at 501.
"401 U.S. at 346.
65 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414 (1959) discusses Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146
A.2d 665 (1958), one of the first cases aplpying the rule imposed in this case.
See RESTATEMENT, 2D at 189-90; Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Co., 232 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Calif. 1964); Young v. State, 455
P.2d 889 (Alas. 1969).
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during the execution of the release agreements in 1957.' More-
over, the release executed by Zenith is substantially identical to
the release in Dura Electric Lamp Co. Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp.,7 which was decided in the year that the release in
Zenith was executed. Dura held that the broad language of the
release reserved rights against no one. Finally, the Court overlooks
the principle that parties are presumed to act in light of the law
existing at the time they made their contract."
The merits of the modem rule may be questioned. Since the
purpose of the rule is to protect the individual releasor who acts in
ignorance of the law, it remains to be seen whether this is the
" Respondent's Reply Brief at 16.
67 Dura Electric Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 249 F.2d 5 (3d
Cir. 1957). Compare the text of the two releases: "Dura Electric Company,
Inc., . . . for and in consideration . . . paid by General Electric Company . . .
has remised, released and forever discharged, and by these presents, does, for
itself, its predecessors, successors and assigns, remise, release and forever dis-
charge General Electric Company and all its subsidiary and successor companies,
all its past, present and future officers, directors, stockholders, agents, employees,
and each and every one of the aforesaid jointly and severally, of and from all,
and all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits, debts,
dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants,
contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages,judgements, extents, executions, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in
equity, which it or any of its predecessors or assignors or its successors or assigns
hereafter can, shall or may have, for, upon and by reason of any matter, cause
or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of
these presents." 249 F.2d at 7.
".... Zenith Radio Corporation and The Rauland Corporation . . . for
and in consideration . . . paid by [inserting "Radio Corp. of America," "General
Electric," or "Western Electric"] have each remised, released and forever dis-
charged, and by these presents does each for itself and its respective subsidiaries,
successors and assigns, remise, release and forever discharge the said [again in-
serting name of appropriate releasee] and its subsidiaries and their respective
successors and assigns of and from all, and all manner of action and actions,
cause and causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckoning,
bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises,
variances, trespasses, damages, judgments, extents, executions, claims and demands
whatsoever, in law, in admiralty, or in equity, which against said [appropriate
releasee] its subsidiaries and their respective successors and assigns, said Zenith
Radio Corporation and The Rauland Corporation and each of them ever had,
now has or which each of them and their respective subsidiaries, successors and
assigns, hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon or by reason of any matter,
cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date
of these presents, not including however, claims, if any, for unpaid balances on
any goods sold and delivered .. "
68 See U.S. v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 347-50 (1966); Worthen Co. v. Kava-
naugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
252 S.W.2d 885 (1953); L. SIMPSON, LAw OF CONTRACTS 214 (2d ed. 1965);
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 5.
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proper rule for an area in which no move is made without advice
of counsel. The new rule affords less certainty than the Restate-
ment rule which forces the releasor to state his intent. The prac-
tical effect of this rule may be that the Court has reversed the
presumption of the common law rule and now has established a
conclusive presumption of intent to retain rights by failure to ex-
pressly release them. The Court does not limit the application of
this new rule to antitrust and patent law. The reasons for the rule
are applicable to all phases of tort law and become more compelling
in cases affecting persons who act without legal advice. Zenith
implies that the presumption against release is now part of the
federal common law.
IV.
The Supreme Court's strong stand against antitrust violations
coupled with the effort to insure that those injured by illegal con-
duct recover to the fullest extent is commendable as is the policy
of giving effect to the intentions of the parties. Whether Zenith
was the proper vehicle for change in the law is questionable. The
strongest argument against the decision is that it is unfair to re-
quire that parties structure their affairs according to the law as it
will exist in the future. Permitting and encouraging claims to be
brought long after the commission of the act which gave rise to
them will result in prejudice to defendants and wind-falls for
plaintiffs.
Robert A. McCulloch
FEDERAL PRACTICE: CLASS ACTIONS-A Class Action
May Not Be Maintained If The Alleged "Class" Includes Only
Twenty-Eight Persons And If The Plaintiff-Representative Cannot
Establish Geographic Dissemination Of The Members Of The
"Class" Or Minuteness Of Individual Damages. Kinzler v. New
York Stock Exchange, 53 F.R.D. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
When the net capital of Goodbody & Co., a New York Stock
Exchange firm, neared the minimum Exchange standard, the SEC
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placed a "freeze" on the transfer of Goodbody employees to other
firms.' Kinzler, a Goodbody employee, initiated a private antitrust
action against the Exchange and Goodbody alleging conspiracy in
the restraint of trade, involuntary servitude, and interference with
contractual rights. Pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Kinzler moved the suit be maintained as a class
action asserting that he was the representative of 1500 Goodbody
employees.! The defendants challenged the motion asserting the
"class" should consist only of those employees who applied for a
transfer during the freeze, or who had inquired about obtaining a
transfer during the freeze, or who had been prohibited from
transfering. If adopted, the defendant's construction of the "class"
would reduce the number of potential class members from 1500 to
approximately twenty-eight. Held: motion denied. A class action
may not be maintained if the alleged "class"' includes only twenty-
eight persons whose plaintiff-representative cannot establish geo-
graphic dissemination of the members of the "class" or minuteness
of individual damages. Kinzler v. New York Stock Exchange, 53
F.R.D. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Under rule 23, a class action must involve a "class" and the
plaintiff must be a member of that class.' Because of the nature of
the class action, the mere allegation of a "class" does not establish
a class action; the court is compelled to examine the facts of the
particular situation in light of the requirements of rule 23 and
enter a finding on the issue.' In this examination, the burden of
persuasion and proof is upon the party asserting the existence of
the class action who must satisfy the prerequisites of rule 23 (a)
'Kinzler v. New York Stock Exchange, 53 F.R.D. 75, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
'The plaintiff, Kinzler, asserted the "class" to be "those who knew that they
were frozen, did not make the vain request, but nevertheless saw their accounts
being transferred to other brokerage houses." Kinzler v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 53 F.R.D. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
'Judge Bonsai defines the "class" to be "those Goodbody registered represen-
tatives who lost customers to other brokerage firms as a result of Goodbody's
precarious financial condition and were unable to follow these customers out of
Goodbody because of the alleged freeze." Id.
'See, e.g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Pavlak
v. Duffy, 48 F.R.D. 396 (D. Conn. 1969); Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D.
258 (D. Del. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See
also 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 23.04, 23.02 (1968) (hereinafter cited as
Moore with all references to volume 3B and to paragraphs therein).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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which include a showing (1) that the class is too numerous to
be joined, (2) that the class has common questions of law or
fact, (3) that there are typical claims or defenses, and (4) that
the class is adequately represented by the plaintiff.' These pre-
requisites are conjunctive rather than disjunctive;' therefore, the
mere aggregation of similar claims or the showing of numerous
members does not alone create a right of class action.' There
exists, however, a dichotomy in the meaning of the term "class"
when used to signify the satisfaction of the rule 23 (a) prerequisites
and when used to signify the "numerosity" concept of rule
23(a) (1). While an order permitting a class action presupposes
a finding that all the rule 23(a) prerequisites have been satisfied,
the establishment of a class too numerous to be joined under rule
23(a)(1) is not necessarily the same as an order permitting a
class action. Moreover, if all the prerequisites of a rule 23 class
action are satisfied, the action must come within one of the three
permissible categories specified in rule 23(b). These categories
include (1) an action where individual suits would create a risk
of inconsistent or varying adjudications, (2) an action with relief
in the form of an injunctive or declaratory judgment, or (3) an
action with common questions of law or fact dominating issues
affecting individual members of the class. Therefore, the granting
of a motion for class action status acknowledges the satisfaction
of the rule 23(a) prerequisites and specifies the particular subdi-
vision of rule 23(b) in which the action is situated.! In Kinzler,
Judge Bonsai interpreted only the rule 23(a) prerequisites. Be-
cause Kinzler failed to satisfy the rule 23(a) (1) requirement of a
I FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See, e.g., Weismann v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258
(D. Del. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 42
F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). See also Moore 23.02-2.
'The coordinating conjunction "and" connecting a series of conditions creates
the following conjunctive series: a + a + a + a = 4a whereas a disjunctive
construction creates the following alternatives: a ± a ± a -t a = a + na. There-
fore the conjunctive is 4a whereas the disjunctive would be a YNo = 12. As a
conjunctive, the rule requires the satisfaction of all four prerequisites rather than
only one.
'See, e.g., Moore 23.04 n. 1 and cases cited therein.
'The subdivision of 23(b) into which the class action is placed can be of
significance for depending upon that classification the claims of the members of
the class may be aggregated to establish an amount in controversy or the class
may be required to give notice to members of the class to allow "opt-outs." See
Moore 23.01; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
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class too numerous to be joined (numerosity), Judge Bonsai did
not have to make the rule 23(b) classification. In adopting a
narrow definition of a "class" for purposes of the numerosity test,
the court reduced the "class" from 1500 members to approximately
twenty-eight."
Although the court is obligated to determine the validity of the
"class action" and enter a finding of its facts, the determination
should be based upon both the number of potential class members
who would be placed at a significant disadvantage if denied class
status," and those who satisfy the rule 23 (a) prerequisites.
In Kinzler, the court accepted pleadings on the rule 23(a) pre-
requisites and fashioned a definition of the "class" which reduced
the number of members to approximately twenty-eight. As a result,
the court played the "numbers game" dismissing the action.
Membership numbering from forty to one thousand has been
construed as sufficiently numerous to constitute a "class" too
numerous to be joined; however, twenty-eight has never been so
ruled. A "numbers game" approach, while effectively eliminating
potential class actions, over emphasizes numerosity. The reliance
upon numbers, without an examination of the other rule 23(a)
segments, cuts short justifiable class actions and forces burdens on
the potential plaintiffs. " The specificity with which the numerosity
test is to be satisfied is antithetical to the primary justification for
the presence of class actions-the class is incapable of joinder and
for judicial facility and administrative ease one action will be per-
mitted." On the one hand, if the class representative can identify
enough members to satisfy the numerosity test, then the opponent
challenges there should be a consolidation and joinder because the
alleged class action is merely an artificial aggregation of separate
1053 F.R.D. at 77.
Judge Bonsal noted that geographic dissemination of the members of the
class of twenty-eight or minuteness of individual damages would be a justification
for the continuance of the suit as a class action. 53 F.R.D. at 78.
1 See Moore 23.05 and the cases cited therein.
13 The class action, as the product of the English equity courts, has tradition-
ally been one of equitable principles. Moore 23.02. The requirements of imprac-
ticality of joinder, common interests, and typicality of claims or defenses have
all stemmed from old equity cases. See Moore 23.02 citing Attorney General v.
Heelis, 2 Sim. & Sus. 67 (1854); Knight v. Knight, 3 P. Wins. 331 (1734); City
of London v. Richmond, 2 Vern. 421 (1701).
"See the Advisory Committee Comments, Moore 23.01.
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causes of action which should be pursued vis-d-vis separate con-
solidated actions. On the other hand, the specificity indicates the
ability to join all interested parties, whereas the inability to specify
an exact number is insufficient evidence to show numerosity.
The primary complaint of the pre-1966 rule was the obscure
and uncertain use of the terms "true," "hybrid," and "spurious"
which were read into rule 23 by the courts. ' Although the 1966
amendment was intended to clarify rule 23 and to set forth with
precision the conditions under which a class action could be main-
tained, this amendment did not succeed in terminating the use of
these terms.1" The courts were so thoroughly indoctrinated that the
amended rule was interpreted as requiring the continued subjective
analysis of the "class" as would have been required under the
earlier version of the rule." Presumably, however, the amendment
of rule 23 meant an explicit rejection of such a subjective evalua-
tion." Instead, the emphasis should be upon the totality of the rule
including the common questions of law or fact, the typicality of
claims or defenses, the adequacy of representation, and the im-
practicality of joinder of the members of the group. The court in
Kinzler rejected this "totality of circumstances" test in favor of an
approach which focuses upon the definition of the term "class"
and tested that "class" against the rule 23(a) prerequisites. This
approach places a gloss upon the amended rule 23 (a) prerequisites.
Notwithstanding civil rights cases and certain stock fraud cases,
rule 23(a) (2) has seldom been recognized as a significant justifi-
cation for permitting the assertion of a class action claim."9 The
23(a) (2) requirement of a common question of law or fact, in-
tended to be one of the fundamental justifications for the existence
of the class action suit, has been evaluated primarily in conjunction
with the rule 23 (b) (3) classification.2' In so doing, the element of
a common question of law or fact has become the passive attendant
"See the Advisory Committee Comments, Moore 23.01 [8]. See also Moore
23.04 and the cases cited therein.
"See Synder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See also Moore 23.04.
"See Synder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (dissent). See also C. WRIGHT,
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of the transplanted "spurious" classification in the amended rule."1
The rule 23 (a) (3) requirement of typicality has, also, taken a rear
seat to the "number's game." Ambiguous as the typicality clause
may be, it serves as good a criterion as does the "number's game.
''
92
Nevertheless, the majority of courts refuse to consider rule
23(a) (3), equating it with adequancy of representation or com-
mon questions of law or fact rather than a factor having independent
significance in permitting a class action." Although typicality has
been classified as an objective test, it should be viewed as the
compliment of "commonness" and operate as a primary feature of
a class action.
In Kinzler, the court, in analyzing the class action motion,
adopted an arbitrary definition of the "class" and tested the result-
ant against the rule 23(a) prerequisites." The court recognized
the existence of a block of individuals possessing common questions
of law or fact and having typical claims; yet, for want of identifi-
cation of additional characteristics, the parties otherwise satisfying
rule 23(a) prerequisites were involuntarily disbanded leaving one
of their number to sue the defendant in a test case. If the individual
recovers, there will be increased litigation with the defendant being
subjected to the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. If
the defendant prevails in the test case, another plaintiff will seek
recovery on another cause of action. The class action rule was not
intended to foster such results.' If the Kinzler decision that a court
should establish a definition of the "class" and test that "class"
against the rule 23(a) prerequisites giving primary import to the
numerosity test is indicative of an emerging interpretation of what
constitutes a justifiable class action, then the courts will be reverting
to the pre-1966 practices and the amended rule has failed in its
purpose. The better approach would be to take the aggregate of
the persons satisfying the rule 23 (a) (2) through (4) prerequisites
and temporarily classify them as a "class" for purposes of the rule
1 Id. See also note 17 supra.
22 See Phillips v. Sherman, 197 F. Supp. 866, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 307-08 (1970); Moore 23.05 and the cases
cited therein.
23 See Moore 23.06.
'See note 3 supra.
'See the Advisory Committee Comments, Moore 23.01.
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23(a) (1) test of impracticality of joinder. For although a class
must be definable at the initiation of the action," established pro-
cedures permit the postponement of a ruling on the motion until
the end of the trial. By this method, the inability to satisfy rule
23 (a) prerequisites still creates a res judicata judgment upon those
actually named in the action and who were within the court's
tentative "class" as set by the 23 (a) (2) through (4) tests.
If the purpose of permitting a class action is to be fulfilled, the
test for permitting the class action should not be numerosity, but
whether all the rule 23(a) prerequisites are satisfied. The "class"
should not be an arbitrary assemblage of plaintiffs, but should be
the "function" of the satisfaction of the rule 23(a) prerequisites.
Thus, if the primary purpose of the class action is to reduce mul-
tiplicity of suits, 7 subjective inquiries into the proper assemblage,
artifically designated as a "class," to deny class status seems
incongruous.
Van P. Carter
26 It is the raison d'etre of a class action that there be a class. Moore 23.05.
The complaint, however, is to be given a fair reading and the issue of the identity
of the class may remain open until a final judgment was entered so long as mem-
bership in that class was distinguishable at the outset. See Koen v. Long, 302 F.
Supp. 1383 (E.D. Mo. 1969); D & A Motors v. General Motors Corp., 19 F.R.D.
365, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); National Hairdressers & Cosmetologists Ass'n v.
Philad Co., 7 F.R. Serv. 17a151 case I (D. Del. 1943). See also Moore 23.04.
2
1 See the Advisory Committee Comments, Moore 23.01.
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